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Abstract 
Do famous athletes have special obligations to act virtuously? A number of philosophers have 
investigated this question by examining whether famous athletes are subject to special role 
model obligations (Wellman 2003; Feezel 2005; Spurgin 2012). In this paper we will take a 
different approach and give a positive response to this question by arguing for the position that 
sport and gaming celebrities are ‘ambassadors of the game’: moral agents whose vocations as 
rule-followers have unique implications for their non-lusory lives. According to this idea, the 
actions of a game’s players and other stakeholders—especially the actions of its stars—directly 
affect the value of the game itself, a fact which generates additional moral reasons to behave in 
a virtuous manner. We will begin by explaining the three main positions one may take with 
respect to the question: moral exceptionalism, moral generalism, and moral exemplarism. We 
will argue that no convincing case for moral exemplarism has thus far been made, which gives 
us reason to look for new ways to defend this position. We then provide our own ‘ambassadors 
of the game’ account and argue that it gives us good reason to think that sport and game 
celebrities are subject to special obligations to act virtuously.  
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Introduction 
Are sporting and gaming celebrities subject to special moral obligations? Before we 
answer this question, we may ask ourselves whether celebrities in general are subject to special 
moral obligations. At the intersection of talent and fame, we have three plausible kinds of basic 
intuitions about how celebrities ought to behave. We might think that (1) celebrities should 
have a free pass as regards their personal morality, or at least be given a greater degree of 
leniency for their moral behavior than ordinary people—perhaps because their lives are more 
stressful than ours, or because their talents are so special and precious—like the ‘free spirits’ 
described in the elitist moral philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Alternately, we might feel that 
(2) celebrities are exactly like the rest of us, and should not receive any special consideration 
whatsoever in the realm of moral action—there can no moral exceptions, and no moral 
exemplars—as in the deontology of Immanuel Kant. Finally, we might believe that (3) 
celebrities merit a greater degree of moral scrutiny than the rest of us, on the basis of their 
being role models and thus setting an example for others to possibly admire and emulate, as in 
the virtue ethics schema of Aristotle. These intuitions give us a good canvas of the logical 
landscape, wherein one of the following statements must be true: 
1. Celebrities have a LOWER level of moral duty than the rest of us (Nietzsche) 
2. Celebrities have the SAME level of moral duty as the rest of us (Kant) 
3. Celebrities have a HIGHER level of moral duty than the rest of us (Aristotle) 
 First, there is the position of (1) moral exceptionalism: the idea that because of a 
celebrity’s natural or acquired talents, they ought not be judged harshly for either (1a) trifling 
moral offences like speeding or littering (call this weak moral exceptionalism), or (1b) more 
serious moral violations like theft or assault (call this strong moral exceptionalism), as this 
would interfere with the valuable exercise of their talents. Take the artist Paul Gauguin’s 
dalliances with pubescent native girls while he was in Tahiti, which most deem immoral. There 
are nevertheless some people who take the position that the world is better off for having 
Gauguin’s nude paintings from that era; that his vicious acts were part and parcel of his creative 
urges, and thus that the talent excuses the immorality in this case (eg. Williams 1981). Along 
these lines, in the spirit of Friedrich Nietzsche, one might claim that the morality of the herd 
should not dictate the actions of free spirits; that the genius of a Gauguin should not be 
hemmed in by the mediocrity and resentment of others. Nietzsche asserts that ‘every superior 
human being will instinctively aspire after a secret citadel where he is set free from the crowd, 
the many, the majority, where, as its exception, he may forget the rule “man”—except in the 
one case in which, as a man of knowledge in the great and exceptional sense, he will be 
impelled by an even stronger instinct to make straight for this rule.’ (Nietzsche 1973 [1886], 
§26, p. 39) The elite, in other words, are justified on a Nietzschean account to draft their own 
moral charters, and are not at all beholden to the dreary social mores of the masses which 
could compromise their authentic modes of being. Of course Nietzsche himself would be 
unlikely to think that many of today’s celebrities fit with his ideas of the elite; but one inspired 
by this line of argument might think that it provides good reason to think that celebrities are 
not subject to ordinary moral standards and have special license to act immorally. 
  However, ‘the many, the majority’ of us have good reason to take a non-exceptionalist 
stance. For anyone who has seen the Leaving Neverland web series, and believe the 
testimonials therein from the people who claim to have been sexually assaulted by Michael 
Jackson at his Neverland Ranch while they were children, it seems clear—Jackson’s talent, great 
as it may have been, cannot excuse his alleged immorality.1 People are people, on the (2) moral 
generalist account, and as such are neither above nor below anyone else in terms of the scope 
of their moral responsibilities: they are all beholden to the same universally applicable moral 
code, regardless of matters of talent. As Immanuel Kant argues, there exists a categorical 
imperative for each of us to uphold the moral contract and treat others with respect—as ends 
in themselves, not means to our own ends. Kant writes that ‘I ought never to act except in such 
a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.’ (Kant 1998 [1875], 
§1, p. 15 [4:402]) No one gets a free pass in matters of morality according to this position, but 
neither is anyone unfairly morally burdened when taken in comparison to anyone else. 
 Finally, there is the position of (3) moral exemplarism: the idea that because of a 
celebrity’s social status, they ought to be judged more harshly for both (3a) serious moral 
violations like theft or assault (call this weak moral exemplarism), and also (3b) trifling moral 
offences like speeding or littering (call this strong moral exemplarism), as these behaviors are 
arguably likely to be imitated by some number of their fans. For example, consider the pro 
golfer Tiger Woods’ multiple documented extramarital affairs, which most deem immoral. 
Many people take the position that the world would be better off for Woods, his fans, and golf 
as a sport more generally, if those affairs had never occurred; and that those vicious acts taint 
his accomplishments on the green. They seem to think that it is worse when a famous and 
 admired athlete normalizes vice in this way, and that the virtuous exercise of talent calls for a 
relatively higher standard of moral conduct on the part of its possessors. 
Along this line, Aristotle stresses the importance of a good moral education, from the 
very beginning of life (Aristotle 1969 [c. 350 BC], Book II, Ch. 3, §2, p. 21); and the behavior of 
role models plays a seminal part of our moral development on his account.2 Aristotle affirms 
that ‘otherwise, no teacher would be needed, but everyone would be born a good or bad 
craftsman. It is the same, then, with the virtues.’ (Aristotle 1969 [c. 350 BC], Book II, Ch. 1, §7, 
p. 19) So on an Aristotelian account, we are at least partially responsible for each other’s moral 
education through the examples that we set—especially those in positions of social 
prominence, whose actions are the most salient to the largest number of people—and it is a 
moral failing if they knowingly or unknowingly contribute to the normalization of vicious 
behavior. Given this, there seems to be good reason to think that those whose fame means that 
they serve as examples to many other moral agents may have special reasons to act virtuously.  
 This survey of positions leaves us with a thorny problem: for, when considering certain 
cases, each of these mutually exclusive positions has plausible intuitive force. However, due to 
the law of non-contradiction they obviously cannot all be true. Therefore, if we do not want to 
pass judgment on the moral infractions of celebrities in an arbitrary, ad hoc manner, we need 
to examine both our intuitions and these theoretical positions more closely. 
 
1. Moral Exceptionalism: The Case for Lesser Moral Responsibility 
 Let us begin with the least plausible position, moral exceptionalism, which is the easiest to 
rule out. It is premised on the belief that celebrities are justified in having unsavory, perhaps 
even immoral, characters on the basis of the value of their cultural products. Often, the implicit 
assumption is that the vice generates, or is instrumentally connected to, the value of the 
expressed talent. Even if this assumption were true—even if Paul Gauguin causally needed a 
steady supply of underage muses to produce his dazzling body of artistic output—strong moral 
exceptionalism could never constitute the basis of a defensible moral system, for this would 
give absolute licence for every talented celebrity to be a moral monster. You could, for 
instance, defend O.J. Simpson’s alleged murder of his wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, on the basis 
of his record-breaking performance for the Buffalo Bills in 1973, in which he became the first 
football player to rush over 2,000 yards in one season. This is an obviously absurd and 
undesirable outcome. Weak moral exceptionalism fares little better, as it would provide 
theoretical justification for a multitude of sociopathic and socially irresponsible behaviors—it 
would be a carte blanche for the gifted to treat the ungifted in a morally callous fashion. 
In addition to the troubling elitism motivating this position, which would result in a two-
tiered morality—one for the dogma-following ‘herd’ and one for the ‘free spirits’ who are 
morally permitted to do whatever they feel like in the moment—there is a difficult 
epistemological issue lurking in the background here as well. For what criteria ought we employ 
to judge who belongs to the moral elite and who does not? What evidence or testimony could 
possibly serve to establish one’s membership to that group of the elect, and thus to whom 
moral exceptions ought to be applied to? We suggest that these significant epistemological 
hurdles give us good reason to set this position aside.  
  
2. Moral Generalism: The Case for Equal Moral Responsibility 
The position that celebrities are neither morally exempt nor moral exemplars can be 
argued for in several different ways. It could be claimed that celebrities are just bad choices of 
role model and so should not be made subject to role model obligations (Feezell 2013, Wellman 
2003). Alternately, it could be argued that role model obligations can only be acquired by 
consent; a consent which is rarely asked for and even more rarely offered (Wellman 2003). 
Finally, it could be objected that these obligations violate a gaming celebrity’s right to privacy, 
and so such obligations can only be acquired through consent (Spurgin 2012). 
It does seem to be the case that most celebrities did not consciously choose to be role 
models (Wellman 2003). Moreover, moral education is arguably more the responsibility of 
parents and teachers, rather than celebrities (Wellman 2003). And, arguably at least, celebrities 
may deserve as much privacy as the rest of us (Feezell 2005, Spurgin 2012). Thus the moral 
generalist theory has some intuitive force to it. 
Adding to the force of these considerations, the case for equal moral responsibility also 
has the theoretical backing of Immanuel Kant. Recall that Kant’s universally binding categorical 
imperative applies to all rational human beings, celebrities and non-celebrities alike. For Kant, 
lying is lying, no matter who’s doing it: it is agent-neutral, and it is equally morally condemnable 
in all cases. 
 Nevertheless, we can raise plausible objections to the case for equal moral 
responsibility. Kant’s theory ignores, for instance, important differences that facts regarding 
personal identity imply for the moral weight and expected consequences of our actions. Its 
weaknesses become clear when considering sample cases. For example, when Barry Bonds was 
caught lying about not taking steroids during his pro baseball career, his actions were 
considered grounds for criminal investigation and a cause for public scandal; whereas if Jane at 
the nearby gym was discovered to be taking steroids despite claiming otherwise, in practice no 
one ought to be deeply concerned. Analogously, if we cheated while playing a casual game of 
chess, it would be (merely) shameful, whereas if Boris Spassky cheated at chess, it would be 
morally outrageous and arguably criminal—partly because there are stakes with actual 
monetary value to be gained or lost at his level of professional play, but also partly because 
Spassky would take the institution of chess itself down a peg with him if he broke the rules (a 
position we argue for in the following sections). 
Moreover, contrary to the intuitively appealing considerations given above, we could 
equally well argue that game celebrities did choose to become elite players with reasonable 
foreknowledge of their enhanced effects on the world, including the mimetic potential of their 
becoming role models, and that their acceptance of their role model status is therefore 
voluntary. We could reasonably posit that moral education is not solely limited to parental 
authority and teaching staff; that we all have a role to play as peers and mentors in each 
other’s moral educations, and that celebrities have a more visible and effective role than most 
others in this process. Finally, we could credibly claim that game celebrities waive many of their 
 privacy rights as ‘part of the gig’: and that, if their privacy were of overriding value to them, 
they would quit the game and so cease to be a celebrity. That fact that they have not implies a 
tacit surrender of the typical privacy rights enjoyed by the general public. 
To review: it seems clear that there exists a double standard between what we consider 
acceptable behavior for game celebrities and what we consider acceptable behavior for the 
average person, which makes the contention that both have the same moral responsibilities 
seem implausible. But why is it seemingly worse when celebrities do bad things, than when 
non-celebrities do the same? We examine some possible explanations for this phenomenon 
below. 
 
3. Moral Exemplarism: The Case for Greater Moral Responsibility 
One popular line of thought is that celebrities have greater moral responsibilities 
because of their position as role models. Wellman, for instance, distinguishes between 
‘exemplarism’—the idea that there is a mimetic causal relationship between celebrities and 
those who admire them, grounding a special kind of moral duty for that celebrity—and 
exemplar ‘skepticism’, which denies the existence of any such duty. The typical form of this 
skepticism can be reduced to a position of ‘generalism’ which we examined above—the idea 
that everybody shares an identical set of moral duties, which do not shift in light of one’s social 
position. 
 The typical argument that is given for the exemplarist position is that celebrities have 
the ability to influence other people and thus to influence whether they become virtuous or 
vicious. As a result, celebrities have a duty to serve as good role models and encourage people 
to become virtuous rather than vicious (Wellman 2003, p. 334). Celebrities are admired, and 
that admiration is linked with a desire to emulate, so people often seek to emulate celebrities. 
Given this, celebrities have special duties to model good forms of behavior (Wellman 2003). Of 
course, everyone has duties to be good example to others, but the thought here is that the 
reasons for celebrities to do so are stronger than they are for other people, due to their special 
influence on other people’s behavior. 
This argument has been criticized by those that think that celebrities are just bad 
choices of role model and so should not be made subject to role model obligations (Feezell 
2013, p. 138). However, even if there is no good reason for someone to be treated as a role 
model, the fact that someone is treated in this way may be enough to generate the role model 
obligation (Wellman 2003, p. 333). This response though, has been criticized for involving a 
commitment to dishonesty, as celebrities must act like role models even though they know 
they are not good a choice of role model (Feezell 2013, p. 138). The argument takes this basic 
form: 
P1: Celebrities have special influence over people’s behavior  
P2: If someone has special influence over people’s behavior then they are subject to 
special role model obligations  
C: Therefore, celebrities have special role model obligations. 
 
 We do not intend to take a stand on the plausibility of this argument or the responses 
that have been made to it. We do though, want to point out that whatever merits this 
argument from special influence has, it does not give us any reason to think that sporting or 
gaming celebrities in particular have such duties. If the source of such duties is one’s status as a 
celebrity then it is an argument that will apply to all forms of celebrity, not just sporting 
celebrities. Perhaps some empirical evidence could be used to show that sporting celebrities 
tend to be more influential than other kinds of celebrity. If this were the case then this would 
give some reason to think that the argument from special influence is more relevant to sporting 
celebrities than other kinds of celebrity. However even if such evidence could be found it would 
not tell us anything distinctive about the obligations that one is subject to in virtue of being a 
sporting or gaming celebrity. Rather, it would be an account of the obligations one faces in 
virtue of being an influential celebrity, and it just so happens that sporting or gaming celebrities 
are more likely to be this kind of celebrity. This does not speak against the plausibility of the 
argument in any way, but it does tell us that if we want to find an argument that tells us about 
the special obligations one may face in virtue of being famous for sport or games then we 
should look elsewhere.  
Is there anything distinctive about sporting and gaming celebrities that could ground 
special obligations that apply only to these kinds of celebrity? One suggestion made by Earl 
Spurgin is that public figures involuntarily acquire role model obligations that are linked to their 
particular field of expertise (Spurgin 2012). This means that a star baseball player has an 
obligation to be an appropriate role model to aspiring young baseball players. In one sense this 
tells us something specific about the special obligations that sporting or gaming celebrities are 
 subject to: they have a special responsibility to model good behavior to those who aspire to 
enter the same field. Again though, interesting as this argument is, it does not really tell us 
anything that is specific to sporting or gaming celebrities. Rather those who accept this 
argument are accepting that an obligation that applies generally to public figures (an obligation 
to be role models for aspiring young people entering the field) applies to sporting and gaming 
celebrities as well. This argument though would equally apply to famous novelists or actors who 
would have special role-model obligations to aspiring authors or actors: to model the role of a 
novelist or an actor appropriately. If we want to find an argument specific to those who 
become famous through sports and games then we must again look elsewhere. We have, thus 
far, argued that: 
• Moral exceptionalism is off the table, for being both elitist and subjectivist; 
• Moral generalism is off the table, for being unable to contend with theoretical and 
intuitive counterexamples to it; and 
• This leaves us with moral exemplarism as the most theoretically promising position. 
• Further: Wellman’s moral exemplarist argument either works, or it does not; 
• If Wellman’s argument does not work, then we will need to examine other formulations 
of exemplarism; 
• If Wellman’s argument does work, then it works for any kind of celebrity; 
• However, we have another, more specific target in mind: sporting and gaming 
celebrities; 
• Therefore, regardless of the merits and demerits of Wellman’s argument, we will need 
to examine other formulations of exemplarism. 
 
4. Feezell’s Role Model View 
 A more promising suggestion, for our purposes, is Feezell’s claim that famous athletes 
acquire a narrow form of role model obligation due to their role as ‘lusory objects’ (Feezell 
2013). The starting point of Feezell’s argument is that playing a game is a freely chosen activity 
that has no external instrumental aim, which is ordered by arbitrarily created rules and 
conventions that are different from those that govern the rest of our lives (Feezell 2013, p. 
145). Moreover, the activities that form part of the game only have significance within the 
world of the game. This means that games create a self-contained world, which is artificial in 
the sense that it would not exist were it not for the willingness of the participants and the 
spectators to accept its arbitrary rules and conventions (Feezell 2013, pp. 147-149). The 
meanings and narratives associated with the game are also set apart of the rest of the players’ 
lives. As Feezell puts the point:  
It is simply not like ordinary life in certain important respects. The world of play is not ‘serious’ 
when we contrast its values and activities to work, war, disease, and human suffering. We are 
constantly reminded that it is important to keep the playing of games ‘in perspective’, as if life is 
more than fun and games or the overcoming of artificial obstacles. On the other hand, 
participants often play with utmost seriousness, and the internal goods of the play world are 
made possible only by being serious about ‘nonseriousness’. (Feezell 2013, p. 146) 
 
Feezell claims that accepting that sports take place in a self-contained world has 
implications for how we should view the role of famous athletes. According to Feezell this 
means that we should treat these athletes as lusory objects, ‘an object whose meaning or 
significance cannot be understood independent of the way in which the game is defined and 
interpreted in terms of its lusory means and lusory goals, that is, its rules and conventions.’ 
(Feezell 2013, p. 149) In other words, the athlete is temporarily transformed into an object in 
the self-contained world of the game. While the game is ongoing, the player is no longer 
 defined by their ordinary identity and identity-conferring commitments but by the role they 
play in the self-contained world of that game. As Feezell puts it, ‘The player who says good-bye 
to his wife and children and drives to the stadium becomes a lusory object when the game 
begins. The person who is a husband and father becomes a “center fielder,” “clean-up hitter,” 
and a “clutch player”.’ (Feezell 2013, p. 149) 
The implication of accepting that the player of the game is a lusory object is that we 
should treat them in something like the way that we treat fictional characters: thus, we should 
not seek to connect the player in their role as a lusory object with the life of the person away 
from the self-contained world of the game. Indeed, Feezell thinks that it would be more 
appropriate to refer to players by their on-field nicknames than by their real names as this 
would make clear the delineation between the person and the lusory object (Feezell 2013, p. 
150). What this means for the question of whether athletes have duties to be role models is 
that they only have such duties within the self-contained world of the game. So famous players 
do have obligations to model appropriate behavior in the world of the game by following its 
rules and norms, and displaying sportspersonship. However, their status as a role model within 
the world of the game does bring with it any special obligations outside of this world. Below is a 
summary of Feezell’s role model view: 
• Games create self-contained worlds ordered by arbitrary rules and conventions; 
• Within this world, athletes are simply lusory objects; 
• Upshot: we should not seek to connect the lusory object to the person’s non-game life; 
• Therefore: any special moral duties celebrity players have would be restricted to the 
self-contained world of the game: the ‘magic circle’. 
 
 However, there is a strong sense in which ‘objectification’—lusory or otherwise—is 
morally problematic. Players are people, of course, and not objects as Feezell’s terminology 
implies, even temporarily. More specifically, players are people who have contractually 
circumscribed the acceptable range of professional actions they might permissibly partake in, to 
those prescribed by their chosen game’s ruleset. And their actions in that game’s arena can be 
parsed as comprehensible within the context of that game, without making the conceptual 
move of completely separating players from the reality of their non-lusory lives (which often 
can, and does, intrude—if only psychologically). 
For a reductio ad absurdum of Feezell’s ‘player as lusory object’ argument, consider his 
own proposed separation of the ‘Charlie Hustle’ baseball persona from the person who is Pete 
Rose. One of these entities, he claims, belongs in the Hall of Fame, and the other in prison or at 
least suffering well-deserved public disapprobation in perpetuity. But how are we to square this 
psychological circle using only the resources of Feezell’s account? Surely, we cannot. For in an 
important sense, our personal lives are obviously not vitiated or suspended by our participation 
in a game. Further thought experiments demonstrate the weaknesses of his model: 
A: Charlie Hustle passionately and tenderly kisses an infielder between innings. After the game, 
Pete Rose is confronted about this incident in the stadium parking lot by his disgruntled wife. He 
replies to her: “Darling, it wasn’t me… It was merely the lusory object known as Charlie Hustle! I 
suggest you read the work of Randolph Feezell before we discuss this matter further.” 
 
B: A toddler named Pete Rose Jr. crawls onto the baseball field during the third inning of the 
game, murmuring ‘Dada… Dada’ and reaches out for Charlie Hustle’s pantleg. Charlie Hustle 
regards the infant with a blank stare of nonrecognition and confusion until a game official 
removes the child from the field. 
 
 Reductio A and reductio B demonstrate, in their own ways, the odd consequences of 
treating a ‘person’ and a ‘lusory object’ as non-equivalent entities. The fact that the scenarios 
depicted therein seem deeply unconvincing—because in an important sense, neither 
husbandhood nor fatherhood are ever truly vitiated, or even suspended, by gameplay—would 
seem to indicate that Feezell’s account is lacking in its explanatory power. Now, it could be 
objected that neither of the interactions outlined in scenarios A or B constitute felicitous moves 
in the game of baseball—and thus that they are ‘illusory’ in a certain sense, and ought to be 
discounted. While this is true in a strict sense, it is equally true that the events depicted in A 
and B certainly count as events which could constitute episodes in a holistic life. Events present 
themselves as chronologically discrete occurrences, typically resulting in a psychologically 
coherent string of experienced phenomena for the person moving through them. Insisting on a 
strong distinction between our lusory and non-lusory personas foists an unnecessary and 
inappropriate schism on game players, solely in service of Feezell’s terminology. 
Were we to repair Feezell’s schema, we feel it would be germane to focus on ‘lusory 
acts’ rather than ‘lusory objects’. People perform lusory acts when they play games, and non-
lusory acts when they do not, but always remain the same people regardless of context—in the 
interest of metaphysical and psychological parsimony. For even in the world of acting, where 
disappearing into a role is considered a virtue, we do not posit that the actor playing the 
character ‘King Lear’ in Shakespeare’s play King Lear becomes the person King Lear and thereby 
ceases to be themselves. That would be mad. Thus we must look elsewhere for a game-specific 
form of moral exemplarism. 
 
 5. Game Ambassadorship as a Species of Moral Exemplarism 
We will argue that in order to understand the nature of gaming ambassadorship we 
need to examine the unique nature of their vocation as players. A game celebrity, by definition, 
rises to prominence by following rules. In particular, they owe their prominence to following 
the rules of the game which has made them famous.3 There are two related points to make 
here. First, you are unlikely to get very far in any game if you systematically ignore the rules. 
When a game is operating as it should, rule breakers will be caught, punished and, in extreme 
cases, banned from taking part in future iterations of the game. Of course there are exceptional 
cases in which some game players are able to break the rules for years before they are caught, 
Lance Armstrong being an obvious example.4 Nonetheless, failure to follow the rules of the 
game means that a player’s rise to fame is generally much less likely to occur, all others things 
being equal. 
The second, deeper point is that games depend for their very existence upon people 
agreeing to follow a certain set of rules. Consider for instance, Bernard Suits’ famous definition 
of games:  
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only 
means permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in 
favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because 
they make possible such activity [lusory attitude]. (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 43) 
 
According to Suits’ view, games only come into existence when people accept a set of arbitrary 
rules which prohibit the use of more efficient means to reach a goal. Without these rules there 
would be no games, and therefore no game celebrities. Even if we do not accept this 
 constitutive account of rules, it seems reasonable to think that any institutionalized game of the 
sort by which people tend to achieve celebrity status in contemporary societies depend upon 
such a set of standardized rules. 
This is perhaps why it may seem logically as well as morally offensive when we see game 
celebrities get caught for cheating at their game, behaving unlawfully outside of it, or acting in a 
socially inappropriate manner; for their acts run counter to the essential ingredients of their 
success. Thus there exists a reasonable intuition that game celebrities have greater 
responsibility to exhibit ‘rule obedience’ than standard players, both within and without their 
chosen games.5 
We witness this dynamic of ambassadorship at work in other fields: what the Pope does 
and says as a representative of the Catholic Church greatly affects the social capital of that 
institution; the opinion of a well-regarded stockbroker can make or break the financial future of 
a company; and morally compromised politicians are considered embarrassments to their 
parties—arguably even to the profession of politics more generally. So, if game celebrities are 
invested in the institutions of their chosen games (and they ought to be, given the depth of 
their interrelationships with them), then they have good (self-preserving) motivation to behave 
as well as they possibly can, both inside and outside of the game.6 On the other hand, a non-
celebrity may lack the power to affect the reputation of the game they play, and thus have a 
more circumscribed version of this moral duty of ‘ambassadorship’, if any at all. 
Now, owing to the fact that game celebrities become celebrities specifically through 
rule-following, we posit that we have an especially good reason, as stakeholders in the game’s 
 institution, to feel betrayed when we see them breaking rules outside of the game. For, if game 
celebrities break non-trivial rules outside the game, where rules presumably matter the most, 
then why wouldn’t they break rules inside the game as well, where (on many accounts) the 
rules are trivial by definition? In such instances, the moral character of the player is 
immediately called into question, and rightly so. A fraudster or adulterer, we may infer, would 
not balk at in-game cheating as well, if the opportunity presented itself—given the premise that 
exhibitions of intralusory vice carry less moral weight than exhibitions of extralusory vice. For 
what should we assume that Diego Maradona would do with Gyges’ invisibility-granting ring, 
given that he shamelessly pulled off the ‘Hand of God’ cheat in front of a packed stadium? This 
merits some reflection. 
Our positive proposal regarding moral duties of ambassadorship for game celebrities 
has the merits of being rather simple and unassuming: 
• Game celebrities have a foot in both worlds, intralusory and extralusory, where actions 
in one sphere directly affect their reputation in the other; 
• Exhibitions of intralusory excellence may enhance a player’s extralusory reach by 
making them a celebrity: if it does, this generates a moral duty of Ambassadorship; 
• The actions of those with Ambassador duties, whether intralusory or extralusory, 
directly affect the perceived value of the game they play. 
 
Of course, our proposal must face a standard range of predictable objections before we can 
hope to convince the reader of its full range of merits. 
 
6. A Standard Range of Predictable Objections to Game Ambassadorship Duties 
 One might object, for instance: ‘Why is there a necessary connection between the 
intralusory and extralusory actions of game celebrities? Isn’t it possible that a person who is 
morally degenerate outside of the game could be completely moral and rules-obedient inside 
the game?’ Our answer: Yes, but that would not be likely: as it would take a rather strangely 
compartmentalized human mind to be a Marquis de Sade in the streets and an Immanuel Kant 
on the soccer pitch. And since the damage or prestige that an ambassador brings to their game 
is predicated on public perception of their actions, rather than metaphysical causality, optics 
are what really count here. These, we reason, are all the plausible grounds that we require to 
defend our claims from an objection from this angle. 
Or, one could reasonably ask, ‘What about celebrity artists? Why don’t we chide them 
as harshly for their bad behavior and self-indulgent actions as we might game ambassadors?’ 
Our account has an answer for this as well: simply put, artists are not made famous by rule-
following. In fact, a rule-following artist is normally a bad artist. Artists are employed in a 
creative field: we do not necessarily expect good moral behavior from them, but rather the 
virtues of inventiveness and ingenuity. We expect that artists will break the rules, early and 
often: there is no standard of behavior on which we might found a duty of ambassadorship for 
them. So while we might experience moral outrage toward artists who behave in an immoral 
fashion, that outrage is not at all logically relatable to the nature of their profession. 
‘That being said,’ one might continue, ‘what about accountants? They’re also from a 
rule-following profession. So why don’t we consider them to be ‘ambassadors of accounting’ 
when they’re caught stealing from their company’s funds, and judge them more harshly on that 
basis?’ Our answer is that we might, if (1) they were famous, and if (2) the value of accounting 
 as a practice could be brought low by their actions. However, there are no world cultures that 
we are aware of that celebrate accounting and accountants to anywhere near the degree that 
the stars of sports and games become socially elevated—so this is contingently not the case. 
Nevertheless, we could imagine a hypothetical culture wherein hotshot accountants were 
carried out on the adoring shoulders of their fans after a tough day of number-crunching. It is 
just not an extremely close possible world to contemplate. 
Secondly, the value of accounting largely hinges on its instrumental payoff: the fruits 
made possible by its performance. So the fact that someone does the job poorly or unethically 
does not threaten our instrumental valuation of the activity. Games, on the other hand, are all 
process, no product. This means that if the value of the process is botched by unethical 
behavior, there is no further value of a product to fall back upon. So the immoral actions of 
game celebrities are deleterious to the institutions of their games in a way that it is both 
contingently and conceptually unique among other rule-following professions. 
There is also a concern for authenticity underlying our position: we assert that celebrity 
players have a uniquely voluntary, uncoerced intentional relationship to the rules. They have 
rationally signed off on obeying these, and have self-identified with them via the intralusory 
acts that made them famous players (as opposed to infamous cheats). This is why it can be 
fairly claimed that game celebrities represent the games they play. Generally speaking, if you do 
not follow the rules you cannot succeed at the game. There is an institution of rule-obedience 
for game players just as there is an intuition of promising for moral agents in the work of Kant. 
If there is no stable institution—if cheating becomes the norm rather than an outlier behavior—
then the game would break down entirely, and therefore there could not be any celebrities of 
 that game: every win would be dubiously suspect, and we could not reliably attribute value to 
any of its intralusory actions. It would be a reasonable concern for the spectators, or the 
potential players, of a badly-ambassadored game institution to ask, for example: ‘Why watch 
cycling if all the riders are doped up?’ or ‘Why try to break my way into pro boxing if all the 
matches are fixed in advance?’ These kinds of concerns demonstrate the deleterious effect of 
an accumulation of instances of bad ambassadorship on the institution of a sport. We can safely 
assume that spectator interest in a sport, as well as the interest of its potential players, largely 
relies on that sports’ representative athletes acting in good faith, in accordance with the 
rulesets of their sports. 
Consider Lance Armstrong: his success relied on the rules of cycling remaining a stable 
institution, even if he himself was not actively following them. It would have been self-
defeating for him to behave immorally if he reasonably expected that his behavior would 
permanently damage or destroy the institution that enabled his success in the first place. His 
cheating was parasitic on his expectation of not getting caught, combined with his underlying 
belief that even if he was caught, the sport of cycling would be strong enough as an institution 
to weather the resultant scandal. 
By this logic, our position indicates that Maradona’s ‘Hand of God’ cheat makes soccer 
itself worse—it is stain on the institution of the game. By acting in bad faith and betraying the 
rules, Maradona betrayed the moral expectations of the fans who supported his team in the 
match, and also the aspirations of an indeterminate number of potential players who viewed 
him as an ambassador of the game. It is a testament to the enduring strength of previous acts 
 of dedicated ambassadorship of better players and better people than Maradona that interest 
in soccer largely continued unabated after that scandal. 
It should be noted that fans, too, can be ambassadors of the game, but to a far lesser 
extent—they, too, are committed to the value of rule-governed practices and can be 
reasonably expected to be rule-observant in other spheres of their lives.7 We can plausibly 
extend the duty of ambassadorship even further, to other stakeholders in the institution of the 
game, such as club managers and referees. For it would be very odd, to say the least, if such 
figures were completely unconcerned with how their actions reflected on their game of choice. 
In summary: if a game celebrity’s behavior gives others good reason to believe that they 
are not acting in good faith regarding a ruleset that they have taken an implicit vow to observe, 
then that is a pro tanto good reason for those others not to join or support that practice. This, 
in turn, generates additional reasons for the game celebrity not to act in bad faith—they have, 
in other words, a duty of ambassadorship. All of this indicates that the actions of game 
celebrities therefore do carry additional moral weight when compared to those of non-
celebrities, or celebrities of non-rule following professions. 
 
Conclusion 
We conclude that moral exemplarism of the game ambassador type is reasonably 
justified in the specific case of game celebrities. A role of prominence is voluntary: it requires 
active collusion and cooperation at every step; as does the implicit acceptance of the increased 
ethical responsibility which accompanies such a role. No one forces a player to play a game; no 
 one forces a player to play that game well enough to win it; and no one forces a player to win 
enough of those games to become a celebrity. However, choosing to do all of these things 
makes a player’s actions more notable, impactful, and socially relevant than if they refrained 
from doing so. Therefore it is not unreasonable to claim that, at the highest levels of game 
celebrity, additional moral duties of ambassadorship appear for the player in relation to the 
institution of their game. 
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